John Deely has long been at the forefront of a semiotics that moves decisively beyond the obsession with language (a form of 8 glottocentrism,,) toward an analysis of signs within the context of a signifying nature. His own intellectual roots go back to the Latin tradition, with particular em phasis on the 1632 work ofJohn Poin sot, the 7hlctatus de Signis, and the essays of C. S. Peirce. This dual line age makes it possible for Deely to rework medieval semiotics in the light of the Peircean analysis of sign/object{mterpretant and to re think the correlation of transcenden tal and ontological forms of signification. Further, like Thomas A. Sebeok, with whom he has often collaborated, Deely takes seriously the concept that all living things par ticipate in unique forms of semiosis tied to what the German biologist Jakob von Uexk:iiJl called the Umwelt.
This configuration of biosemiotics, Peircean triadic semiotics, and late medieval theories ofsignification rep resents a uniquely powerful synthesis that brings semiotic theory to a new level of sophistication.
Deely redefmes the philosophical tradition along semiotic lines so that it can be reshaped to better serve the needs of a more global understanding of meaning. Semiotics is held to be not so much a method of methods as a point of view that can use several methods for its articulation. This point of view insists that all ideas are about objects other than themselves and never about themselves alone. An idea is by definition a sign ofsome thing that mayor may not be another idea. Yet even other ideas are embod ied and are thus part of a world that is in some basic sense physical. Deely redefines the physical to include any thing that exists independently ofhu man thought. Ideas are fully semiotic and do not represent detached sense data that somehow need to be opened out to a larger order of signification.
Signs, whether ideas are not, serve to make objects present in the first place. More basic than objects are things which are independently real existents that may not yet be part of a web of signification. Insofar as a thing enters into relation with an ex periencing organism, it becomes an object. The thing now stands within cognition in some respect, and is thus an object. An object becomes a sign when it stands for something else. Thus there is a fairly straightforward evolution from the presemiotic status of the thing to the fully semiotic and mediated status ofthe sign itself. For Deely, the thing is fully embodied and is physical and is thus part of a semiotlcally dense nature that lies underneath culture and the more ar bitrary codes of anthroposemiosis (i.e., human and linguistic forms of aemiosis). Objects are always embod ied as well but may not be physical.
Deely lavishes some care on the dis tinction between a transcendental and an ontological relation. Underly ing these two forms ofrelationality is a deeper sense of relativity that in sists that all things and objects are relative to some context. This is fur ther refmed to show that an object or sign may have an asymmetrical form of relevance to another; that is, it may influence some other order but not be influenced in turn. This acknow ledgment of asymmetry saves Deely from falling into a form of process naturalism in which each order is held to be relevant to each other order in some basic respect. Put differently, Deely acknowledges that nature con tains genuine forms of discontinuity.
A transcendental relation involves relationa1ity across and through the various modes of time. At the eame time, a transcendental relation per tains to the object itself and involves its conditions of knowability. Such relations are not "real" relations but, .... comparative requirements of ac tion and intelligibility"(p. (2). In this sense, a transcendental relation in volves the possibilities that obtain within the object itself regardless of any actual or potential physical forms of interaction. Yet, a transcendental relation is more than the set of possi bilities inherent within an object but functions as a kind of dynamic inter pretant guiding and shaping the se miotic moves of the sign-using organism. The transcendental rela tion serves as the ground for the onto logical relations. In other words, a transcendental relation is an antici pation of relation and lives at the heart of nature itself.
An ontological relation, on the other hand, involves interaction be tween the object and other orders that lie outside of the internal possibilities within the object. It should be noted that Deely uses the technical term ·subjective being" (via Poinsot) as his equivalent to the object as it is in itself prior to its extrinsic forms of relation ality. That is, an object will have sub jective roots that are pre-relational. Any given object will participate in both forms of relationa1ity and one mode will be privileged over the other in given contexts.
Th clarify the differences between a transcendental and ontological rela tion, Deely gives the example of a gardener fmding a bone while digging in the garden. From the gardener's perspective the bone has no intrinsic meaning. Yet, from the standpoint of a paleontolotogist the bone takes on a far different meAning: What has happened here? A physical relation, recognized for what it had been, thanks to the dynamic interaction of its fun dament (the bone) producing physical changes in the student of paleontology's optic nerves, became at the same moment also a sign of what had been. A transcendental relation, the bone of a dinosaur, which once had a physical relation to that dinosaur, but no more (the dino saur being dead), yet gave rise to an objective relation corre sponding somewhat with the physical relation that had been. The gardener's rock had become the paleontologist's sign. (p. (9) Thus, the paleontologist trans forms the mere "rock" into a bone that has an ontological (or physicaVobjec tive) relation to its deceased owner. Yet, this possibility remained «within" the "subjective being" of the bone as one of its transcendental possibilities. The effect of the bone on the optic nerve is, of course, a bare physical relation. The semiotic move of seeing it as a dinosaur bone involves an awareness of both ontological and transcendental traits. The unveiling of a transcendental relation involves thirdness (intelligibility and general ity) while an ontological relation, es pecially if it is physicaVobjective, may remain on the level of mere second ness (brute causal interaction).
Once these primal forms of reIa tionality are clarified, Deely moves on to exhibit the semiotic structures of prehuman orders. Animals inhabit an Umwelt that itself functions as a biological order of meaning serving the needs of the species. The inner cognitive map of the animal, the In nenwelt, serves the needs of commu· nication and makes it possible for the individual animal to live in consort with the species'specific Umwelt.
Deely wishes to show how the basic categories of semiotics apply to the animal kingdom and thus link the realm of zoosemiotics more closely to anthroposemiotics. Animals also live in a world in wbich aliquid stat pro aliquo (one thing stands for another),
The plot thickens when Deely struggles to illuminate the realm of physiosemiosis (physical semiosis). Unlike Peirce, he refuses to entertain panpsych1sm \matter is effete mindj or import teleological categories into the non-living realms ofnature. As is well known, Peirce was never fully clear on the· status of psychic traits within nature as a whole. For exam ple, does a physical interaction in· volve an 1nterpretant (sign generated by the representameJVobject correla tion)? Deely argues that physio semiosis is in the realm of aecondness (brute interaction) and that it in volves what is best termed a "virtual" semiosis. This move frees Deely from the panpsychist plun,re while still giv ing him the maneuvering room to show how all ofnature has at least an implicit semiotic structure.
Deely concludes with a brief retro spective look at the evolution ofsemi otic theory inthe Westwith particular attention to Augustine, Locke, Pain sot, Peirce, and Jakob von Ue:xkiill. The inner logic of this movement points toward a semiotics of nature that locates the semiotics of culture as one of its sub-species. The priority of nature comes out most strongly in Uexkiill's analyses of Umwelten and in Peirce's three categories (fU'Stness, secondness, and thirdness).
This work is in many respects an impressive achievement. It makes it clear that no semiotic theory will long prevail that ignores the uttersuprem acy of nature in any analysis of sign functions. At the same time, it ex plores new conceptual territory on the boundary between late Medieval con ceptions of transcendental relations and the Peircean triadic semiotics of sign/object/interpretant. Deely is to be commended for grappling with the metaphysical issues thatremain rela tively unexplored at the heart of semi otic theory.
Yet, a vexing question remains. Has semiotic theory probed as deeply into the heart of nature as is required in order to fmd a truly general frame work for explaining the ubiquitous world of signs? It is one thing to en gage the biological sciences in a quest for a pre-human form of semiosis, but it is yet another to develop a meta· physical perspective that locates signs within and among orders ofrele vance that may not be semiotic. Deely is certainly on the right track when he talks of "virtual" semiosis, but it is even more imperative that he enter into the elusive momentums of a nature that is forever beyond the grasp of sign-using organisms. Put differently, the concern is not only with finding a more encompassing that further work needs to clarify. In this aho volume, Steven DeLue addresses the astion of political ob ligation in a li society. His focus, however, is 80mew t narrower than that suggested by e title. DeLue omits the historical diS ion of the problem and, instead, con ntrates on the debate in Anglo-Ameri politi cal theory of the past two d,
